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Today, countries increasingly turn to preferential trade agreements (PTAs — also known as 
bilateral or regional trade agreements) as the primary method of liberalizing trade between 
nations. Some World Trade Organization (WTO) members have even proposed that the 
on-going multilateral negotiations focus on maintaining existing tariff schedules, rather than 
making progress on the more challenging development issues of the Doha Round (Bridges, 
2009a). Challenged by the difficulty of negotiating an agreement, these countries have 
lowered their expectations for multilateral trade liberalization, and diverted their resources — 
and their hopes — to bilateral or regional efforts.
For this and other reasons, 
PTA formation has soared 
in recent decades. Yet aside 
from the ongoing discussion 
of the tangled rules of origin, 
relatively few papers have 
delved into broader aspects 
of legal incompatibility 
among various agreements 
(Estevadeordal and 
Suominan, 2004: 1). This 
issue brief argues that in the 
long run, increased reliance on PTAs for trade liberalization will force countries to maintain 
inconsistent legal standards. In turn, liberalization through bilateral and regional agreements 
will lead to higher trade costs, greater susceptibility to international litigation, and incoherent 
national legal institutions. Instead of achieving piecemeal liberalization through PTAs, 
member states should abandon preferential agreement negotiations and redouble their 
efforts at the multilateral level.
Rachel Denae Thrasher is 
a Pardee Center Research 
Fellow whose work 
focuses on international 
trade agreements and 
their implications for 
economic development in 
the developing countries 
of Latin America. She 
holds both a law degree 
and a master’s degree in 
International Relations 
from Boston University.
www.bu.edu/pardee
“...liberalizationthroughbilateral
andregionalagreementswilllead
tohighertradecosts,greater
susceptibilitytointernational
litigation,andincoherentnational
legalinstitutions.”
2
The FReDeRick S. PaRDee cenTeR FoR 
The STuDy oF The LongeR-Range FuTuRe
www.bu.edu/pardee
Trends in “Regionalism” 
The most recent wave of regional and bilateral trade agreements goes broader and deeper 
than the agreements of earlier years (Carpenter, 2009). Preferential trade agreements since 
the conclusion of the WTO’s Uruguay Round in 1994 have covered more trade-related topics 
and deepened existing commitments to tearing down trade barriers. Furthermore, the current 
wave of agreements contains many developed-developing country partnerships, indicating 
that developed countries are entering into more reciprocal relationships than previous 
preferential schemes (e.g., the Generalized System of Preferences) (Fiorentino, 2009). 
 Some view this proliferation as a boon to broader and deeper trade liberalization. Others, 
however, view it as a threat to the multilateral trading system and especially to the current 
development agenda (Fiorentino, 2009). Ironically, many of these PTAs come into force under 
the purview of the WTO. Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
as well as subsequent WTO legislation, makes room for such preferential arrangements and 
attempts to regulate them by imposing notice and formation requirements. According to 
WTO data, more than 150 of the 200-plus agreements in force today were concluded and 
notified in the wake of the Uruguay Round. With the increase in PTA notifications, WTO 
members have moved to clarify existing substantive rules and streamline the process for 
notification and examination. 
By and large, however, 
these efforts have failed. 
The application of Article 
XXIV and subsequent 
standards has done 
virtually nothing to shape 
preferential agreements 
between members. Since 
the Treaty of Rome in 
1957, only one PTA 
yielded a clear finding of 
consistency with the WTO 
rules. In early 1996, the 
Committee on Regional 
Trade Agreements was 
formed to consider 
questions of consistency 
and reflect on the larger 
implications of regional agreements on the multilateral system (Fiorentino, 2009). On both 
accounts it proved unsuccessful. 
The current Doha Round brought the rules regarding PTAs to the negotiating table for the first 
time since the signing of the GATT in 1947 (Fiorentino, 2009). As a result, the members came 
to a preliminary Decision on a Transparency Mechanism for Regional Trade Agreements. And 
while the Transparency Mechanism has streamlined the notification process and improved 
the availability of information about preferential agreements, failed attempts have shown that 
WTO members can come to no mutually agreed conclusions about the proper regulation of 
PTAs between members. Some would like to strengthen the rules, by raising the requirement 
for “substantially all the trade,” while others would prefer less meddling from the WTO 
(Fiorentino, 2009). Focusing on WTO management of PTAs has simply put another issue on 
the table that will thwart multilateral consensus. 
Source: WTO data on Regional Trade Agreements (2009).  Note that the cumulative numbers in the charts are not 
equivalent due to varying ways of calculating PTA notifications.
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Pros and Cons 
Despite repeated failures, countries still hope for an agreement on WTO oversight while 
they seek out new preferential trade partners because preferential agreements carry several 
advantages over the multilateral system. They can exceed both the subject matter and the 
scope of current disciplines under the WTO. When formed within regions, PTAs can promote 
intra-regional trade, promising 
economic growth, improved 
balance of payments, and 
even increased foreign direct 
investment (Khan, 2009). 
PTAs can also act to meet 
the specific needs of a few 
countries, making agreements 
more quickly and using fewer 
resources to achieve an accord. 
Furthermore, developing 
nations can work together to 
negotiate common interests 
and gain bargaining power in 
multilateral talks. But perhaps 
the most convincing reason 
for clamoring to form these 
agreements is that nations 
realize they will be left out of 
the preferential “inner circle” if 
they hesitate (Carpenter 2009).
Though the immediate benefits are clear, the growing, overlapping web of agreements also 
presents many challenges both to individual countries and to the multilateral trading system 
as a whole. Elsewhere, I (and others) have argued that many PTAs, especially those between 
developing and developed nations, go so much deeper than the multilateral system and have 
such a broad scope of trade coverage that they leave very little policy space for developing 
countries attempting to grow their economies (Thrasher and Gallagher, 2008). Others have 
pointed out that for the developing world, bilateral trade negotiations give countries more 
“voice,” (opportunity to speak) but less “say” (ability to influence the final agreement) (Najam 
and Swart, 2005). 
The protectionist nature of these preferential agreements 
presents an even more fundamental problem for free trade 
enthusiasts. Ironically dubbed “free trade agreements,” these 
arrangements, by including some countries and excluding 
others, threaten to “render most favored nation (MFN) the 
least favored status in the world” (Carpenter, 2009: 22). 
Contrary to popular belief, free trade agreements derive 
from a mixture of trade liberalization and protection 
(Bhagwati, 2008). Trade agreements eliminate barriers between member nations, but 
effectively raise barriers toward nonmember countries. As economists have shown, these 
free trade areas actually threaten to lower global welfare by diverting trade away from more 
efficient nonmembers to less efficient FTA members (Bhagwati, 2008). Finally, as preferential 
agreements proliferate, the likelihood of trade policy inconsistency increases. Interlocking 
www.bu.edu/pardee
“...aspreferentialagreements
proliferate,thelikelihoodoftrade
policyinconsistencyincreases.”
Source: WTO data on Regional Trade Agreements (2009).  “Accessions” refers to countries joining existing 
preferential arrangements. Note that the cumulative numbers in the charts are not equivalent due to varying 
ways of calculating PTA notifications.
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trade agreements and discordant legal standards will likely give rise to unforeseen trade costs, 
litigation over inconsistent legal standards and even inconsistent national legal institutions in 
the long run.
Trading Costs 
Just as the promise of low-cost negotiation draws many countries to trade liberalization 
via preferential agreements, the high cost of implementation should drive them away. 
Interlocking, inconsistent trade agreements can increase the costs of trade in a variety of 
ways, many of which are unforeseen at the signing of these agreements. Already, overlapping 
trade-related agreements have begun to wreak havoc on the neighboring countries of Uruguay 
and Argentina as they have attempted to attract foreign investment into their territories.
In 2005, plans to build a pulp mill on the Uruguay River between Uruguay and Argentina 
mobilized the people of Gualeguaychú, Argentina in protest against the perceived 
environmental impact of the mill (Chidiak, 2009). The conflict began small, but soon the 
stakeholders saw the international implications of the mill. Over the course of five years, 
four international agreements have acted to bind government hands rather than resolve the 
issue. Neither the Uruguay River Statute nor the Common Market of the Southern Cone 
(MERCOSUR), which govern use of the river resources, has been able to resolve the rights 
of the parties (Chidiak, 2009). The Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 
places constraints on Uruguay’s pulp mill regulations and emissions. Meanwhile, a bilateral 
investment treaty (BIT) between Uruguay and Finland prohibits policymakers from unduly 
interfering with the Finnish firm, Metsä Botnia Oym, who contracted to build the mill. As a 
result, Uruguay’s tourism industry has been severely affected (Chidiak, 2009). 
Argentina likewise faces the unforeseen consequences 
of signing multiple trade-related treaties in an effort to 
integrate into the global economy and attract foreign 
investors. In 2001, Argentina experienced an economic 
collapse likened to the Great Depression, suffering 
extreme economic and political instability (Burke-White, 
2008). In response, Argentina’s policymakers imposed 
certain currency and tariff measures to stabilize the 
economy and the country as a whole (Burke-White, 2008). 
Unfortunately, the measures caused foreign investors in 
the public utilities sector to lose a significant percentage 
of their investment and expected returns. To compound 
the problem, according to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), Argentina is party to 56 BITs, exposing the country to international arbitration for 
breaching its treaty commitments. As a result of the crisis, Argentina has faced over 40 claims 
by private investors worldwide (Burke-White, 2008). And these claims do not belong in small 
claims court. The U.S. firm CMS Gas Transmission Company was awarded $133.2 million by 
one arbitration panel and another panel awarded BG Group, a U.K. energy company, $185 
million (Peterson, 2009).
Paying High Costs for Uncertain Outcomes
In the presence of conflicting trade agreements, where the scope of overlapping subject matter 
is much greater, the danger of unforeseen trade and litigation costs is even higher. It would be 
www.bu.edu/pardee
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one thing if the price to pay for dispute resolution was well worth it — if disputes were final 
and conflicts were resolved. However, too often, countries pay handsomely for uncertain and 
inconsistent outcomes. 
As discussed above, the Uruguay River Statute and MERCOSUR each govern the use of river 
resources applying a different legal standard and resorting to distinct adjudicative bodies. 
Consequently, the outcome of the Uruguay-Argentine conflict remains highly uncertain. In the 
context of investment arbitration, a case against the Czech Republic first brought this concern 
to the public eye. Lauder v. Czech Republic presented two separate arbitrations, one under the 
U.S.-Czech BIT, and the other interpreting the Netherlands-Czech BIT, that reached opposite 
conclusions on the same question of law (Burke-White, 2008). In Argentina’s investment 
conflicts, separate panels hearing identical claims, even 
under the same treaty, have returned contradictory  
decisions (Peterson, 2009). 
This problem is not unique to the southern hemisphere. 
Even the developed world will become vulnerable to costly 
procedures and uncertain outcomes. In agreements formed 
with the United States, for example, very small textual 
differences can make a difference in a dispute outcome. 
Although known for their uniformity and legal consistency, 
the investment chapters in U.S. free trade agreements (FTAs) 
have evolved over time, creating small discrepancies in the 
legal standards (Edsall, 2006). 
One such discrepancy revolves around the question of whether and when a government may 
indirectly decrease the value of a foreign investment without compensating the investor. Under 
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arbitral panels have protected states’ 
rights to impose non-discriminatory public regulations except where the state made “specific 
commitments” otherwise (Edsall, 2006). In later agreements, however, the U.S. has leaned 
more in favor of the private investor. The Dominican Republic - Central American Free Trade 
Agreement does this, among other ways, by emphasizing the importance of the economic 
impact on the investor in determining whether nationalization has occurred. 
If international legal outcomes are uncertain, then government investment regulation may 
increasingly come under attack and countries may have to pay unforeseen damages to private 
investors for previously approved domestic legislation. Although sympathies run low when 
discussing the fate of the U.S. in a dispute against a foreign investor, it is the developing world 
that more often has had to pay for their regulations that affect private investors, and it is the 
developing world that will remain more vulnerable to indefinite legal standards. 
Tangling Regulation and Tumbling Institutions
As PTAs continue to proliferate, countries will have to pay with more than just dollars, pesos, 
and yen to resolve conflicts. In state-to-state dispute resolution, undeterminable case results 
could undermine the legislative process — where a country and its citizens are never sure that 
they can rely on their own laws. In countries that are still attempting to build up coherent 
institutions, conflicting PTAs pose a stumbling block. 
Many developing nations, as they form trade alliances with the developed world, are beginning 
to see how these North-South trade agreements conflict with existing developing world trade 
www.bu.edu/pardee
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arrangements. In Peru, for example, civil society has given voice to various concerns over the 
recent U.S.-Peru FTA (Amazon Watch, 2009). One main concern lay in the increased level of 
intellectual property protection required, relative to the level permitted under the Andean 
Community Intellectual Property Regime, of which Peru is a member.
And the conflict isn’t catching anyone by surprise. After multiple meetings of the Andean 
Community Commission, the first nonconsensual vote of the parties made room for Andean 
countries to make future adjustments to “develop and deepen” intellectual property 
protection (Ramirez, 2008). On the surface, the Commission’s new decision aims at 
harmonizing PTA legal standards to avoid the problems of conflicting agreements. 
Yet some conflicts remain unresolved. The FTA requirement that Peru pursue “reasonable 
efforts” to provide plant patenting, for example, leaves open the question of how that 
obligation might coexist with the Andean Community provisions that prohibit patent 
protection for all living organisms (García, 2008: 10). Negotiating trade agreements with 
Canada and the European Union as well, Peru is vulnerable to variable standards that could 
undermine its national legal institutions, making even domestic law difficult to rely on 
(Bridges, 2009b).
Deepening Trade and Avoiding Legal Inconsistency in the Long Run
The concern over PTA proliferation is particularly poignant for the developing world; it is 
the developing world that has the most to lose from increasing trade costs. Developing 
countries often lack the infrastructure and expertise to defend themselves in international 
courts of law. And many developing countries are still attempting to build up strong, coherent 
institutions. Uruguay has already begun to reap the consequences of declining trade from 
unresolved international conflict. Meanwhile, Argentina faces the high costs and uncertain 
outcomes from signing bilateral investment treaties with multiple partners. Peru and the rest 
of the Andean Community face an escalation of legal inconsistency as they pursue new trade 
agreements with the European Union and others (Bridges, 2009b). 
Although joining hands with the developed world promises to bring 
Peru up to the next level in development, it is more likely to undercut 
the stability of Peru’s domestic legal institutions by conflicting with 
existing laws and treaties. 
Some countries have anticipated these difficulties and tried to 
protect themselves. Guyana’s president resisted signing the Economic 
Partnership Agreement with the European Union until he received 
reassurance that the law of the Caribbean Community will take 
precedence in cases where the two conflict (Jamaica Gleaner, 2008). 
Nevertheless, the web of PTAs is becoming more, not less, complex. 
For obvious reasons, negotiating bilateral trade pacts costs much less in terms of time and 
financial resources than successfully negotiating multilaterally. With only two or three trade 
partners at the table, agreements can be reached more quickly, providing both negotiators 
and policymakers with more immediate gratification. Negotiating with only a few partners 
could also make the domestic legal changes more politically palatable. By contrast, 
negotiating at the multilateral level admittedly places high human and financial resource 
demands on countries. If the Doha Round is any indication, discussions take place over years, 
sometimes decades, of protracted negotiations. These talks, while making some progress, 
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often lead to a stalemate on one issue or another, forcing negotiators to return to the  
same ground a year or two later. 
Yet the high initial cost of multilateral negotiation will be well worth it in the end. By 
liberalizing trade at the multilateral level, countries can avoid the long-term costs of 
maintaining inconsistent trade agreements. Uniform international standards will protect 
countries from unnecessary exposure to international disputes. Likewise, clear, consistent 
rules will protect them from declining trade volumes as a result of those conflicts. More 
fundamentally, focusing on multilateral trade liberalization will make more space for 
countries to establish and maintain coherent national institutions by eliminating the 
obstacle of inconsistent laws and treaties.
Going forward, then, members of the multilateral trading system should abandon 
negotiations at the bilateral and regional level and take another look at the current Doha 
Round. They must recommit to negotiating and coming to agreements. Because in the  
long run, only a multilateral system can lead to stable, consistent and truly free trade.•
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